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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of reinsurance in the managing the liquidity or reserve fund
risks facing a crop insurer. Using 31 years of data, combined with Monte Carlo simulation the
paper illustrates a mechanism for calculating reinsurance premiums and determining the post
insurance risk profile. The insured event is over a range of loss ratios, and the focus of the
paper is on reserve fund balances.
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Empirical Issues in Crop Reinsurance Decisions
In Ontario, the Crown Corporation responsible for crop insurance (Agricorp Ltd.) faces two
problems. First, there is a need to reduce the effect of a catastrophic loss on reserve funds and
maintain  reserve fund liquidity, thereby  guaranteeing the self-sustainability of the crop insurance
program. Second, crop insurance must minimize year-to-year variation in premium rates to
provide stability to farmers and predictability for the budgeting processes of the two levels of
governments (federal and provincial) which fund the program.  This stability could be achieved
only by purchasing private sector reinsurance, as Ontario is not a part of a federal-provincial
reinsurance plan.
This paper empirically investigates stop-loss reinsurance strategies under (7) different
reinsurance trigger levels and then examines their respective impacts on the reserve fund balance.
The objectives are to
1.  show how the decision to reinsure and the choice of reinsurance trigger depends on how
willing the crop insurer is to take risk,
2.  examine how reinsurance meets the business objectives of the agency, and
3.  illustrate why the relationship between reinsurance triggers and capital reserve fund balances
are important.
The objectives are met using 31 years of historical crop insurance data (e.g. loss ratios) for
Ontario. In addition to analyzing the historical data to determine the expected indemnity from a
reinsurer’s perspective, Monte Carlo simulation is used to determine possible outcomes and
likelihood’s for variables such as the loss ratio, reinsurance claims, and fund balances. Seven
trigger levels based on loss ratios are examined. Since the crop production technology has changed
in terms of biotechnology and management techniques (e.g., high yielding, pest, disease and
drought resistant varieties), the analysis is also done using  the most recent 16 years  of data to
more realistically represent the present risk profile.
Background
With the exception of Miranda and Glauber  (1997)  and Turvey, Nayak, and Sparling
(1999) no serious academic research has focused on reinsurance in the agricultural marketplace.
Miranda and Glauber (1997) argue that if failures in agricultural insurance markets are due to
systemic or systematically correlated risks rather than adverse selection then the emerging3
reinsurance market, or even exchange traded derivatives based on area yields, can provide a
mechanism for the transfer of risks outside of  agriculture. They point out that the most
efficient type of reinsurance could be based on (U.S.) State average yields. Turvey, Nayak and
Sparling (1999) developed an economic theory of the reinsurance problem.  An economic
model described the risk portfolio of the insurer, was used to explain insurer risk,  and posited
the actuarial solution for the reinsurance premium calculation if reinsurance were to be
purchased on an entire risk portfolio.  This extended Miranda and Glauber (1997) to a multiple
crop rather than single crop (e.g. a portfolio of 1) reinsurance contract, and accounts for not
only the systematic risks of individual crops across spatial lines, but also for systematic
correlation across crops. Turvey et al (1999) also show that the significance or benefits of
reinsurance may not be explicitly defined by indemnities alone but rather the liquidity of capital
held in reserve funds. Consequently, for a crop insurer with significant cash reserves the need
to reinsure would be minimal while one with low cash reserves would require reinsurance to
provide liquidity.
Approaches to Reinsurance
Quota share reinsurance is mostly used by emerging or growing insurers whose portfolio
contains risks with a high level of homogeneity. The reinsurer and the reinsured share in the
profits and losses in proportion to the size of their share. It is difficult to place quota share
reinsurance and there is little interest or appetite among most reinsurers it. It is also not suitable
for Crop insurers with reasonably high reserve fund balances and an ability to offset large
liabilities.
Excess of loss reinsurance is one of the most effective and widely used forms of
reinsurance. It provides capacity and stability by capping losses at a fixed retention level. It is
simple, easy to administer and is suitable for crop insurers with well diversified portfolios and
in a position to absorb average while reinsuring peak losses.
This paper investigates stop-loss reinsurance strategies for a diversified crop insurer with
several possible stop loss layers of reinsurance. The information of interest is the expected
indemnity and the possibility/probability of being indemnified from the reinsurer and the effect
that the reinsurance/no reinsurance decision has on the crop insurer’s reserve fund level.4
Calculating the expected indemnity from the reinsurers perspective is crucial to judge whether
the premium rates quoted by the reinsurers is reasonable and actuarial for the crop insurer.
Methodology:
Of the several methods of pricing excess of loss reinsurance, loss experience rating is
the most common approach.
1 Since Agricorp has substantial historical (and publicly available)
information the loss experience rating method is used in this study. One of the basic
assumptions made is that the proportion of the crop insurer’s crop mix/customer base equals the
average weighting of the portfolio over the time horizon used. One of the possible changes to
this assumption could have been to set 1999’s crop insurance portfolio mix equal to the1998
mix. Turvey et al (1999) show that expected indemnities are conditioned on the proportion and
riskiness of crops in the insured portfolio.
The analysis is done using two sets of data. One set of analysis was done using 31 years
(1967 to 1997) of aggregate provincial loss history.  To account for changes in technology,
climate and other factors a second data set comprising  the most recent 16 year’ loss history
(1982 to 1997) is used..
Monte Carlo Simulation:
The data was analysed using Monte Carlo Simulation. The theoretical distribution that
best describes the empirical distribution of historical loss ratios was selected using Palisade
Corporation’s BestFit computer program by conducting three goodness of fit tests: (1) Chi-
square test (2) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (3) Anderson-Darling test. Twenty-eight theoretical
distributions were tried and the best-fit distribution was selected by averaging the ranks given
by the three tests.
The beta distribution best described the empirical loss distribution for both 31 and 16-
year information. The estimated parameters and the distribution function are
Beta(0.55,1.56)*2.77+.27 and Beta(0.30,0.79)*2.17+.27 for the 31 and 16 year horizons
respectively. Ten thousand observations were drawn using Palisade corporation’s @Risk
                                                       
1 Where there are no historical losses available retention exposure rating method is used. This involves setting a
price on the values and types of risks that are large enough to potentially impact the treaty.5
computer program. Reinsurance claim and reserve fund balances under different stop loss
layers are also simulated using the simulation outcomes of loss ratio.
Results
The expected indemnities from the reinsurer calculated using the historical loss ratio and
simulated loss ratio under seven stop loss scenarios are given in Table 1. The expected
indemnity is highest with 175 x 125 layer and lowest with 50 x 250 layer. (The terminology
means that loss ratios above 1.25 are to be insured up to a maximum of 3 (1.25+1.75) in the
first case and between 2.50 and 3.00 (2.5+.50) in the second case.)Both of these scenarios may
not be of interest to the crop insurer since it would transfer higher risk to the reinsurer with 175
x 125 and hence it will be expensive, while transferring minimal or no risk with the 50 x 250
layer. It may be noted that each of the seven scenarios designed, individually, may not be of
interest. However, These scenarios are designed in such a way that it should be able to create
many other scenarios without doing further analysis, and the calculated/simulated indemnities
serve as a bench mark information set to assess whether the reinsurance premiums quoted by
the reinsurance companies are actuarially reasonable.
The reinsurance claim rates (as a % of premium collected) are calculated using 31 and 16
year historical information with the16 year analysis more closely reflecting the current crop
plan design and risk profiles of the crop insurer. It is interesting to note that the expected
indemnities are the same for 150 x150 and 100 x 150 stop loss layers (Table 2) when 16 years
information is used. It indicates that the crop insurer would be transferring the same level of
risk to the reinsurer under both these layers.
Loss Ratio Analysis
The minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation and skewness of empirical and
simulated loss ratios are given in Table 2 . The simulation (and also historical information)
analysis indicates (for 16 year history) that if the best possible outcome occurs, the loss ratio
would be 0.27 and if the worst possible outcome occurs the loss ratio would be 2.44. The
average loss ratio is 0.87 with a standard deviation of 0.67.
The distribution of loss ratios is positively skewed. This implies that the probability of a
loss ratio less than the mean (i.e., less than 0.87) is higher than the probability that the loss ratio6
will exceed the mean. The simulated Beta is less positively skewed than the empirical
distribution. The implication of this in interpreting the simulation results is discussed below.
The probability of occurrence of losses is given in Table 3. Based on 16 year information,
the probability of a loss ratio being less than 1 is 66.52%; less than 1.25 is 73.23%; less than
1.5 is 79.07%; and the probability of the loss ratio exceeding 2.5 is zero. It should be noted that
the Beta distribution used for simulation is more positively skewed than the empirical
distribution. This means that the estimated probabilities associated with falling below the above
loss ratios may be conservative in a sense that actual probabilities could be higher.
Reinsurance Claim Rates and the Probability of Occurrence
The probabilities of occurrence of different claim rates are given in Table 4. The
possibility of “no claim” is high under all stop loss layers studied. The probability of the loss
ratio falling below 1.25 is 73%; falling below 1.5 is 79%; falling below 2.0 is 90%; and falling
below 2.5 is 100%. This means, for example, that 79% of the time there will be no claim from
the reinsurer when the crop insurer is responsible for all the indemnities below a loss ratio of
1.5 and above a loss ratio of 3.0.The results also indicate that there is an 81.3 % chance of
claiming less than the premium paid with stop loss layers of 150 x 150 and 100 x 150;  80.78%
for 50 x 150;  90.10% for 50 x 200; 74.7% for 25 x 125; and 77.1% for 175 x 125.
Simulation of Fund Balance under Different Stop Loss Layers and NO Reinsurance
The reserve fund balance is simulated assuming that the starting fund balance is $222
million and annual premium collected would be $70 million. The results are given in Tables 5
and 6. Table 5 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviations of the
simulations under the various stop-loss layers. If the worst case loss occurs (minimum fund
balance), then the reserve fund balance will be highest with the 175 x 125 layer ($194.65
million) followed by 150 x 150 and 100 x 150 ($179.83 million), 50 x 150 ($152.12 million),
50 x 200 ($148.91 million), and 25 x 125 ($136.02 million). The fund balance will be lowest
with no reinsurance ($121.20 million). If the best case loss occurs the trend will reverse. That
is, the fund balance will be highest with no reinsurance ($273.10 million) followed by 25 x 125
($270.42 million); 50 x 200 ($270.01 million); 50 x 150 ($269.02 million); 150 x 150 and 100
x 150 ($265.93 million); and 175 x 125 ($263.24 million).7
It may be noted that the probability of the fund balance going below $100 million is zero
with all the stop loss layers including the no insurance strategy (Table 6). The probability of
the fund balance going below $150 million is zero with 150 x 150, 100 x 150, 50 x 150 and 175
x 125. There is a 10.75% probability that the fund balance may go below $150 million with 50
x 200, 9.85% probability with no reinsurance, and 5.38% probability with 25 x 125. The
possibility of the fund balance falling below the base reserve fund balance ($222 million) is
lowest with no reinsurance (33.48%) and highest with the 175 x 125 layer.
The results indicate that the choice of the stop loss layers really depends on the
objective(s) of the crop insurer. For example, if the objective is to have a minimum fund
balance of $100 million then all strategies are equally preferred (not considering the cost). If
the objective is to have a minimum fund balance of $150 million then the strategies 50 x 200,
25 x 125 and no reinsurance could easily be  discarded.
It is important to distiguish between probability of loss and actual loss when
interpreting Tables 5 and 6, for these are in themselves separate and mutually exclusive
corporate objectives. For example if the objective is to minimize the maximum loss in reserve
funds then there is a clear signal by the results in Table 5 that to reinsure at some level would
be prudent since the no reinsurance scenario does result in the lowest possible fund balance.
Capital reserve requirements and agency requirements may force the crop insurer to reinsure
against such possibilities. In contrast, if the objective is to minimize the probability that fund
balances decrease from current levels then the best alternative would be to do nothing. In fact
the no reinsurance scenario not only sets the possibility for the largest fund reserve of  $273
million, but also has the greatest probability of  seeing an increase in the fund. To rely on the
probability of outcomes criteria would likely be imprudent in the real world, especially when it
is noted that the no-reinsurance scenario has the lowest mean and the highest standard
deviation.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper set out to investigate some empirical issues relating to the problem of reinsuring
agricultural crop insurance losses. These objectives were to8
1)  show how the decision to reinsure and the choice of reinsurance trigger depends on how
willing the crop insurer is to take risk,
2)  examine how reinsurance meets the business objectives of the agency, and
3)  illustrate why the relationship between reinsurance triggers and capital reserve fund balances
is important.
This paper used monte carlo simulation to investigate the impact of reinsurance on the fund
balances of a crop insurance company. The means of reinsurance was not directed at the
reserve balances per se, but rather the loss ratios directly. The industry practice is not to
reinsure all losses below a target, but rather to reinsure a range of losses. For example a
reinsurance contract may stipulate that the reinsurer will indemnify the crop insurere for all
losses above a loss ratio of 1.5 and less than 2.5. The crop insurer would then be responsible for
losses between 1.0 and 1.5, as well as those above 2.5.
The extent by which a crop insurer will actually reinsure depends upon a number of
factors.  The most important factor appears to be reserve fund balances which maintain the
liquidity of the insurance company. The higher the reserve fund balances the better able the
company is to self-insure and the less likely it will require reinsurance.  In addition, the
requirement for reinsurance depends upon the nature of the organisation and the attitude of its
managers and directors toward risk. On one hand it would be easy to dismiss reinsurance if the
objective is to select the strategy which has the least probability of falling below current reserve
fund levels. Because a no reinsurance strategy requires no premiums this strategy would be
best. However, crop insurer have legislative mandates and boards of directors who view the
funds as belonging to the customer base rather than the corporation and their objective is to
ensure the maintenance of the fund not in probabilistic terms but in real dollars. In this regime
the worst case outcome would be to not reinsure since this has the greatest impact on downside
risk and poses the biggest threat to liquidity.
While a great deal of current research investigates the relationship between crop producers
and crop insurers, research on the relationship and role of reinsurance is lacking. This paper has
provided a realistic assessment of the role that reinsurance (can play) plays in the agricultural
economy, and illustrates ways in which reinsurance premiums can be calculated.9
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Table 1: Expected Indemnity from the Reinsurer under Different Stop Loss Layers





11.72% 10.87% 6.23% 4.64% 0.85% 4.28% 16.01%
Expected Indemnity





10.25% 10.25% 5.83% 4.42% 0.00% 3.83% 14.08%
Expected Indemnity
(Simulation) 10.31% 10.31% 7.81% 2.51% 0.00% 5.95% 16.26%
Table 2: Historical (H) and Simulated (S) Loss Ratio
No. of Years of
Information
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness
31 Years (H) 0.27 3.04 0.99 0.69 1.34
31 Years (S) 0.27 3.03 0.99 0.69 0.94
16 Years (H) 0.27 2.44 0.86 0.67 1.55
16 Years (S) 0.27 2.44 0.87 0.67 0.9411
Table 3: Probability of Occurrence of Loss
Probability of Falling Below the Loss Ratio of No. of Years
of
Information
0.5 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50 3.03
31 Years 33% 48.93% 60.40% 69.40% 77.05% 83.31% 88.52% 92.77% 96.13% 100%
16 Years 46% 58.26% 66.52% 73.23% 79.07% 84.42% 89.57% 94.84% 100%
(2.44)
N/A12
Table 4: Simulated Reinsurance Claim Rates and Probability (in %) of Occurrence
(16 Years of Information)
Claim Rate as a Percentage of Premiums Re
insurance
Layers
































150 x 150 79.1 79.3 80.2 84.4 89.6 94.8 97.2 98.5 100 81.3
(10.31)
100 x 150 79.1 79.3 80.2 87.5 91.6 96.0 100 81.3
(10.31)




50 x 200 89.6 90.6 91.6 92.7 94.8 96.0 97.2 98.5 100 90.1
(2.50)
50 x 250 100 100
(0.00)
25 x 125 73.2 75.5 76.8 77.9 100 74.7
(5.95)
175 x 125 73.2 79.1 84.4 89.6 77.1
(16.26)13
Table 5: Simulated Fund Balance under Different Stop Loss Layers and No Re-insurance
  (16 Years Information)
Stop Loss Layers Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
150 x 150 179.83 265.93 231.33 34.36
100 x 150 179.83 265.93 231.33 34.36
50 x 150 152.12 269.02 232.68 37.36
50 x 200 148.91 270.01 229.95 43.40
25 x 125 136.02 270.42 232.78 40.49
175 x 125 194.65 263.24 232.82 28.46
No Re-insurance 121.20 273.10 231.29 46.93
Assumptions: Starting Fund Balance = $222 million, Annual Premium = $70 million14
Table 6: Probability (in %) of Fund Balance Falling below the Selected Levels




0 50 100 150 200 222 250 255 260 263 265 266 269 270 273
150 x 150 0 0 0 0 27.74 36.62 53.72 58.74 90 100
100 x 150 0 0 0 0 27.74 36.62 53.72 58.74 90 100
50 x 150 0 0 0 0 26.63 35.23 51.14 61.08 100
50 x 200 0 0 0 10.75 26.28 34.79 50.38 59.83 90 100
25 x 125 0 0 0 5.38 20.56 34.61 50.07 59.34 90 100
175 x 125 0 0 0 0 28.71 37.87 56.25 71.41 100
No Re-
insurance
0 0 0 9.85 25.21 33.48 48.13 62.32 100